Sparse attention is widely used to accelerate long-context inference in modern large language models (LLMs), but its input-dependent execution behavior introduces previously unexplored privacy risks.
We identify a new GPU micro-architectural side channel, termed Sparsity-Induced Memory Access (SIMA), which arises from secret-dependent key-value cache access patterns induced by sparse attention.
Based on this observation, we present SparLeak, a phase-aware side-channel attack that extracts SIMA traces during LLM inference and enables two practical privacy extractions: query attribute inference from prefill-phase traces and autoregressive response reconstruction from decoding-phase traces.
By reconstructing approximate token-level sparsity profiles from page-level observations and applying profiling-based learning, SparLeak accurately recovers sensitive information, including user-query attributes and private LLM response content.
Extensive evaluation across three LLM architectures, three sparse attention mechanisms, and three privacy-sensitive datasets shows that SparLeak achieves average attack success rates of 90.9% for attribute inference and 87.3% for response reconstruction under real-world LLM serving settings, highlighting the significance to account for SIMA leakage when deploying sparse-attention-based LLM systems.
We provide anonymized SIMA traces, trained attack models, evaluation scripts, and documentation as artifacts at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/Janus_artifacts/.