Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for improving the quality of generated contents of Large Language Models (LLMs) by grounding responses in external knowledge, thus reducing hallucinations and factual errors.
However, recent studies have highlighted a critical vulnerability: adversaries can exploit the retrieval process to extract personally identifiable information (PII) from the underlying corpus.
To mitigate this risk, we propose a novel defense, RAG-CT, that identifies malicious queries by analyzing their entropy and margin distributions and using a score-based detection method.
Extensive experiments with four state-of-the-art attack strategies and four defense baselines on two datasets show that our approach significantly reduces PII leakage while outperforming existing defenses.
This work provides a lightweight yet effective mechanism to protect RAG systems against PII leakage without requiring modifications to the underlying LLM or retriever.